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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 45, Number 1, 1970
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
THEIR USE AND EFFECT
IN WASHINGTON
Philip A. Trautman*
Modem summary judgment procedure originated in England in
1855, as a device to preclude frivolous and fictitious defenses to ac-
tions on commercial paper. Steady evolution of the procedure in Eng-
land and the American states, characterized by expansion of its
scope to include more parties in more types of actions, Was culmi-
nated with the incorporation of motions for summary judgment into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Rule 56 authorized use
of summary judgment procedures by any party in any action, whether
formerly denominated legal or equitable, as to both liquidated and
unliquidated claims.'
Adoption of summary judgment procedures in the states, however,
was not so rapid. As late as 1950, established civil procedure in the
State of Washington was justly criticized for its lack of such a device
for quick and easy disposition of actions involving no genuine issue
of material fact.2 Several years later, Washington substantially,
adopted the federal summary judgment procedure, in what is now
Civil Rule 56, effective November 1, 1955.1 By 1963, twenty states
had rules resembling the federal procedure, twenty-one states had
their own peculiar rules, and only nine states had no rule or statute
authorizing summary judgments.4
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; BA., University of Washington, 1952,
J., 1954.6 J. MooRE, FEDEAL PRACTICE RULES PALEPHET 937-38 (1966).
Comment, Summary Judgment, 25 WASH. L. REV. 71 (1950).
'Provision was made for summary judgment by WASWNGToNr RULE o PLEADING, Prac-
TICE & PROCEDURE 19(1), effective January 3, 1955. However certain- details for implemen-
tation were added which became effective November 1, 1955.
' D. PASTON, SUMARY JUoDGMENT, TnE MOST EFEArCvE WEAPoN IN TuE ARSENAL OF
LEaAL ADINiISTRATION, 29 (1963).
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I. PURPOSES OF THE PROCEDURE
In general, summary judgment procedure may be used to deter-
mine what need exists for a trial, according to whether there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether one of the parties
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. By enabling an early
conclusion to litigation, summary judgments minimize expenditures
of time and money by the parties, and serve the public interest by
decreasing court congestion.5 Availability of the procedure may elim-
inate the necessity of the extensive preparations otherwise required
for a trial.6 Even when judgment is not rendered on the whole case
or for all the relief sought, benefits may result in that the court may,
if practicable, make an order specifying those facts not in contro-
versy and those controverted in good faith, thereby limiting the scope,
duration, and expense of the subsequent trial.'
II. MOVING PARTY'S BURDEN
A. Genuineness of the Factual Issues
Under Civil Rule 56, summary judgment can be rendered only
when it is shown that there exists no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
function of the court in ruling upon a motion for summary judgment
is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine whether such issues
exist.' Thus, the first critical determination required of a court con-
fronted with the motion relates to the genuineness of the pleaded
factual issues.
The method used for determining genuineness of factual issues
in summary judgment proceedings is different from the one used in
resolving motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A complaint
should not be dismissed unless, weighing its language in favor of the
pleader, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no possible set
Compare the claim that summary judgment procedure is the "most effective weapon
in the arsenal of legal administration," in Shientag, Summary Judgment, 4 FORDHAM
L. REV. 186 (1935), with a more recent and more conservative evaluation in Bauman,
A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IN. LJ. 467 (1958).
8 H. I-hcxmAw & T. SCANLON, PREPARATION FOR TRIAL 224-25 (1963).
See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RuLES PAMPHLET 943-44 (1966).
'Hughes v. Chehalis School Dist. No. 302, 61 Wn. 2d 222, 377 P.2d 642 (1963).
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of facts which would entitle him to relief under his claim. A motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim might be denied, and yet a
later motion for summary judgment may succeed, if it is shown that
under no provable set of facts is the claim (or defense) good.
That is, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
may pierce the formal allegations of fact stated in the pleadings, in
its search for genuine factual issues. Once such an issue is discovered,
summary judgment is precluded. For example, Fleming v. Smith 0
involved competing claims to life insurance by a decedent's son and
mother. The lower court granted the son's motion for summary judg-
ment. Though there was evidence to support such a conclusion, the
Supreme Court also noted evidence in the record which might sup-
port the mother's claim. It was held that the trial court could not
weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and
the case was reversed and remanded for trial.
Generally, the Washington Supreme Court is disposed to affirm
the denial of a motion for a summary judgment more often than the
grant of the motion." An excellent example of the court's tendency
to find a claimed factual issue to be genuine is Salvino v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co.' Suit was instituted under a policy requiring that the
insured's disability have begun before a certain date. The defendant
company served a request for an admission by plaintiff that he had
once stated that his disability commenced after that date. When
plaintiff failed to answer the request, it was deemed admitted under
Civil Rule 36,1' and the company moved for summary judgment on
' Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn. 2d 351, 359 n.15, 363 P.2d 138, 143
(1961).
64Wn. 2d 181, 390 P.2d 990 (1964).
Cases in which it was concluded that the existence of genuine issues of material fact
precluded the grant of summary judgment are Bartlett v. Northern Pac. Ry., 74 Wash.
Dec. 2d 886, 447 P.2d 735 (1968); Mills v. Inter Island Tel. Co., Inc. 68 Wn. 2d 820,
416 P.2d 115 (1966); McCuUough v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 68 Wn. 2d
127, 411 P.2d 894 (1966); Peterson v. Peterson, 66 Wn. 2d 120, 401 P.2d 343 (1965);
Slemmons v. ShotweU, 64 Wn. 2d 595, 392 P.2d 1007 (1964); Haney v. Radio Corp. of
America, 64 Wn. 2d 163, 390 P.2d 980 (1964); Foote v. Hayes, 64 Wn. 2d 277, 391 P.2d
551 (1964); Jorgensen v. Massart, 61 Wn. 2d 491, 378 P.2d 941 (1963); Haase v. Helge-
son, 57 Wn. 2d 863, 360 P.2d 339 (1961); Burback v. Bucher, 56 Wn. 2d 875, 355 P.2d
981 (1960); Cogswell v. Campbell Equip. & Constr. Co., 56 Wn. 2d 832, 355 P.2d 546
(1960); Brannon v. Harmon, 56 Wn. 2d 826, 355 P.2d 792 (1960); Palmer v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 52 Wn. 2d 604, 328 P.2d 169 (1958).
64 Wn. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 366 (1964).
"XWAsH. Civ. R. [hereinafter cited as Civil Rule] 36(a) provides in part: "After com-
mencement of an action a party may serve upon any other party a written request for
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the basis of that admission. In opposition, the plaintiff filed an affi-
davit from his doctor, stating that the disability had begun earlier.
The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on
the ground that plaintiff had admitted only that he had made the
statement, and not that the statement was true. Thus, there remained
a genuine issue of material fact as to the date when plaintiff became
disabled, and a trial was necessary.14
A genuine issue as to the credibility of the movant's evidence sim-
ilarly requires denial of a motion for summary judgment. Such an
issue may be raised by contradictory evidence, or by impeachment
of the movant's evidence. If the contradictory or impeaching ev-
idence is reasonable, there is a genuine issue of credibility which
must be resolved by trial.1
Even when evidentiary facts are not disputed, a motion for sum-
mary judgment will be defeated if different inferences may be drawn
from the evidence in the record as to ultimate facts (e.g. intent,
knowledge, good faith, or negligence).16 Similarly, a motion must
be denied if reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from
the undisputed evidentiary facts.'
The test for genuineness of a material factual issue under a motion
the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in
and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth
in the request. . . .Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than 10 days
after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow on
motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party re-
questing the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the ground that
some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the request is
otherwise improper in whole or in part, together with a notice of hearing on the objec-
tions at the earliest practicable time ... .
1 Another example of a similar interpretation of an admission is Phillips v. Richmond,
59 Wn. 2d 571, 369 P.2d 299 (1962).
1 Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn. 2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968). In Balise v. Underwood,
62 Wn. 2d 195, 381 P.2d 966 (1963), the court concluded that there was a genuine issue
as to a material fact where the plaintiff attacked the credibility of defendant-movant's
witnesses. The court denied defendant's motion even though the plaintiff would have to
'"come forward with something more" than such an attack in order to prevail at the trial.16Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn. 2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960). See Pratt v. Water Dist.
No. 79, 58 Wn. 2d 420, 363 P.2d 816 (1961). See also Thompson v. Ezzeil, 61 Wn. 2d
685, 379 P.2d 983 (1963), in which the court sustained a grant of summary judgment
based in part on "necessary" rather than "conflicting" inferences.
'Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wn. 2d 465, 423 P.2d 926 (1967); Mathis
v. Swanson, 68 Wn. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966); Peterson v. Peterson, 66 Wn. 2d 120,
401 P.2d 343 (1965).
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for summary judgment is thus similar to the test applied to a motion
for a directed verdict.' In both cases, the court must consider the
material evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, most
favorably to the non-moving party; and, after such consideration,
if reasonable men might reach different conclusions, a genuine factual
issue is presented, and the motion for summary judgment should be
denied.19
Assuming the test is properly applied, a grant of a summary
judgment does not infringe either party's right to a jury trial. When
there are no genuine issues of material fact to be decided, a jury
would have no function, and neither the federal nor state constitu-
tions require that the case be submitted to a jury.20 Because sum-
mary judgment may not be granted unless the court can state as a
matter of law that one party must prevail, there is no discretionary
power to grant the motion.
There is, however, apparently some discretionary authority in the
court to deny a motion for summary judgment. For this reason, at-
torneys cannot completely forego preparations for trial, even when
they are confident that they will be granted summary judgment. The
court apparently may, in its discretion, deny the motion even when
there appears to be no genuine issue, if it believes that justice will
be better served by presenting the case to a jury.2'
Although Civil Rule 56 potentially applies to all civil actions,22
yet some types of actions are naturally more suited to summary
determination. These include actions on commercial paper and writ-
18See Trautman, Motions Testing the Sufficiency of Evidence, 42 WAsH. L. R.v. 787,
797-802 (1967), for a general discussion of the test to be applied.
"See Wood v. Seattle, 57 Wn. 2d 469, 358 P.2d 140 (1960), in which the Supreme
Court reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that plaintiff-ap-
pellant's evidence, considered most favorably to that party, presented a genuine issue of
fact on the question of contributory negligence. See also Robert Wise Plumbing & Heating,
Inc. v. Alpine Development Co., 72 Wn. 2d 172, 432 P.2d 547 (1967); State ex rel. Bond
v. State, 62 Wn. 2d 487, 383 P.2d 288 (1963); Balise v. Underwood 62 Wn. 2d 195, 381
P.2d 966 (1966).
'Nave v. Seattle, 68 Wn. 2d 721, 415 P.2d 93 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 450
(1967).
" See discussion and citations in 4 L. ORLAND, WASNGTON PRACTICE 246 (2d ed.
1968). Civil Rule 56(f) suggests a discretionary power in the trial judge in providing,
"When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party oppos-
ing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential tojustify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just."
"14 L. ORLAND, WASinGNTON PRAcTIcE 246-48 (2d ed. 1968).
Washington Law Review
ten contracts, and actions involving simple affirmative defenses
(such as res judicata or the statute of limitations) .23 Summary ad-
judication is less often appropriate in actions for negligence and
divorce, and in cases which raise issues of constitutionality or broad
public policy.24 However, even when the type of case seems inap-
propriate for summary determination, a motion for summary judg-
ment may yet be expedient with regard to particular issues, and
occasionally as to the entire case.25 Thus, litigants should never ig-
nore the potential use of the motion.
B. Materiality of the Factual Issues
As noted earlier, Civil Rule 56 permits summary judgment only
when there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact. A mater-
ial fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. It
is not enough that there be disagreement upon some issue; that issue
must have some bearing upon the outcome of the case. Thus, a sum-
mary judgment has been held proper in an action on a promissory
note, despite the alleged secret intent of one of the parties; 26 sum-
mary judgment was appropriate in a personal injury suit by an
invitee, where there was in fact no defect in the premises despite the
alleged deceptive nature of the area; 27 and summary judgment was
the appropriate conclusion to an action brought to determine the
validity of a testamentary residuary clause, where all of the alleged
issues could not change the legal significance of the language used
in the will.28
These are representative of common situations in which summary
judgment will be granted for lack of a material factual issue-where
all of the factual issues presented, regardless of their outcome, can-
not affect the resolution of the ultimate legal question presented.
'See Gaines v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 62 Wn. 2d 45, 380 P.2d 863 (1963).
'See Washington State Bar Association Seminar, Motions for Summary Judgment 20
(1958); and Foster, Summary Judgment Procedure 2(a), 2(b) (1955).
'See Lundgren v. Kieren, 64 Wn. 2d 672, at 677-78, 393 P.2d 625, at 628-29 (1964),
in which the court stated: "Negligence claims normally involve factual disputes, but, if
no genuine issue of material fact is presented when the motion for summary judgment
is heard, the issue may be summarily resolved."
IZedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wn. 2d 50, 380 P.2d 870 (1963).
'Hughes v. Chehalis School Dist. No. 302, 61 Wn. 2d 222, 377 P.2d 642 (1963).
' Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wn. 2d 838, 405 P.2d 602 (1965). See also
Carlson v. Milbrad, 68 Wn. 2d 847, 415 P.2d 1020 (1966).
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Another excellent example is Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Se-
attle v. Seattle.29 In that case, property owners sued to enjoin the
vacation of a nearby, but not adjacent, street, contending that they
had purchased their properties in reliance on a recorded plat desig-
nating the street, that the street provided the principal and most
convenient access to their properties, that closure would create a
fire hazard, that their properties would be substantially and perma-
nently damaged, and that closure of the public street was for a pri-
vate purpose. In conjunction with defendant's motion for summary
judgment, plaintiffs and defendants filed conflicting affidavits con-
cerning these complex issues. After examining each contention in
detail, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
award of summary judgment on the ground that the issues presented
either were not factual in nature, or were not material due to plain-
tiff's lack of standing to challenge the vacation. Thus, even highly
complex factual issues which appear in pleadings and/or affidavits
may be considered immaterial in rendering summary judgment, es-
pecially when it is necessary to test only the relation of those factual
issues to the ultimate legal question involved in the case, and it is
relatively easy to determine whether or not the outcome of the case
depends upon the asserted factual issues.
Immateriality is often less clear, and summary judgment more
difficult to obtain, when the materiality of genuine factual disputes
cannot be determined with reference to the ultimate legal issue alone.
Consider, for example, Jolly v. Fossum,30 in which a city employee
brought a libel and slander action against a mayor-elect and a news-
paper, for their alleged defamatory statements that the plaintiff had
used city-owned equipment without authorization. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, on the ground that
the city council's alleged oral authorization to use the equipment was
a nullity, and no written authorization was alleged. The trial court be-
lieved that whether or not the oral authorization was actually given was
immaterial. The Supreme Court reversed, on this collateral legal
question, holding that written authorization was not necessary, and
that plaintiff's deposition alleging oral authorization was sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
-52 Wn. 2d 359, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958). The case is noted in Comment, Summary .Tudg-
me t, 34 WASH. L. RL v. 204 (1959).
so59 Wn. 2d 20, 365 P.2d 780 (1961).
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III. PUTTING THE PROCEDURE TO WORK
A. Affidavits and Related Materials
As previously stated, a primary purpose of the summary judgment
procedure is to provide for an early determination of whether a gen-
uine issue of material fact exists. Demurrers, motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and motions for judgment on the pleadings
can raise only those defects which appear upon the face of the plead-
ing.3' Summary judgment procedure authorizes a speaking motion,82
by which it is possible to proceed beyond and behind the pleadings
in search of factual issues. 3
How is this accomplished? Civil Rules 56(a) and (b) provide that
either party to an action may move for summary judgment "with
or without supporting affidavits." Clearly, the absence of affidavits
does not preclude success of the motion, but affidavits are usually
used, and are the primary vehicle by which genuine factual issues
are brought to the court's attention. Because extra-record informa-
tion is ordinarily necessary to ascertain the existence of a genuine
factual dispute, affidavits provide the most feasible, and most com-
mon method of informing the court.8 4
Of course, an affidavit, not being subject to cross-examination, is
a poor substitute for a live witness; and because summary judgment
procedures are not intended to avoid trials of disputed factual issues,
the Washington court has been inclined toward generally strict en-
forcement of the requirements as to affidavits. The best rule of thumb
is that an affidavit should follow substantially the same form as tes-
timony the afflant might offer in court.85
Again, the filing of affidavits is not technically required for a suc-
cessful motion for summary judgment. Civil Rule 56(c) provides
"Thoma v. C. J. Montag & Sons, Inc., 54 Wn. 2d 20, 337 P.2d 1052 (1959), noted in
35 WASH. L. Rav. 224, 226-27 (1960).
'Gaines v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 62 Wn. 2d 45, 380 P.2d 863 (1963). The court
referred to the summary judgment procedure as being in the nature of a speaking
demurrer.
'The present rules relating to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a
motion for judgment on the pleadings allow the court to treat speaking motions there-
under as motions for summary judgment. See Civil Rule 12(b) and (c). See also 6
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE RutLs PA PHLET 427 and 841 (1966).
'Washington State Bar Association Seminar, Motions for Summary judgment 10
(1958).
"'Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 874; 431 P.2d 216 (1967).
Vol. 45: 1, 1970
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that summary judgments may be rendered on the basis of "the plead-
ings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any," submitted by the parties.
When affidavits are not utilized, however, the motion may not
achieve its full effectiveness. For example, in Maki v. Aluminum
Building Products,86 defendant moved for summary judgment with-
out filing either an answer or affidavits. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment even though the only instrument before the court
was plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed, stating that, while it did not imply that Civil Rule 56 re-
quired an answer or affidavits, the posture of the case at the time the
motion was brought required the court to treat it as a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. Such a claim was stated, and the
motion for summary judgment without answer or affidavits failed.8V 7
Ordinarily, the party opposing the motion will also wish to sup-
port his position with affidavits. This will sometimes be difficult for
the opponent if, for example, knowledge about the case is solely in
the hands of the moving party and there has not been sufficient time
to obtain discovery or to locate a witness. When it appears that the
party opposing the motion cannot present by affidavits the facts es-
sential to justify his position, the court may deny the motion for
summary judgment, or may order a continuance to permit the taking
of affidavits, or other discovery procedures, or "may make such other
order as is just. '88
Attorneys are accustomed in many proceedings to making asser-
tions on information and belief. In seeking a summary judgment,
these are not sufficient. This is well-illustrated in Stringfellow v.
Stringfellow. There, plaintiff moved for summary judgment with
supporting affidavits. Defendant filed no controverting affidavits,
but contended that his cross-complaint served to raise genuine issues
73 Wn. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186 (1968). See also Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wn. 2d 777, 399
P.2d 591 (1965).
'As to one of the plaintiffs, a copy of a contract and answers to written interrogatories
were presented in addition to the complaint. The motion as to that plaintiff was treated as
one for summary judgment but was denied upon the ground that factual issues existed.
Civil Rule 56(f).
53 Wn. 2d 639, 335 P.2d 825 (1959). The case is noted in 35 WAS."L. Rav. 224
(1960). See also Carlson v. Milbrad, 68 Wn. 2d 847, 415 P.2d 1020 (1966) ;.Loss v. De-
Bord, 67 Wn. 2d 318, 407 P.2d 421 (1965); Peninsula Truck Lines, Inc. v. Tooker, 63
Wn. 2d 724, 388 P.2d 958 (1964).
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of fact. The Washington Supreme Court held to the contrary; the
answer and cross-complaint were verified by defendant's attorney
on belief alone, which did not satisfy the requirement that affidavits
be based on personal knowledge. Thus, plaintiff's affidavit was ac-
cepted as stating the facts, and the summary judgment was af-
firmed.4 0
Only that matter in affidavits consisting of facts admissible in
evidence will be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
Hearsay statements and allegations in the nature of conclusions of
law will be disregarded in the search for genuine factual issues. The
affidavit must also show on its face that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters recited therein, although it is not necessary
that it specifically allege such competency.4
Furthermore, sworn or certified copies of all papers referred to
in any affidavit must be attached thereto or served therewith. 42 If
this is not done, the opponent may move to strike the affidavit, al-
though failure to so move constitutes a waiver. 3 In any event, the
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by de-
positions or further affidavits. 44
Finally, if it appears that any affidavits have been presented in bad
faith, or solely for the purpose of delay, the court will order the
offending party to pay his opponent any reasonable expenses incurred
in opposing the affidavits, and the wrongdoing party and his attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.45
As pointed out earlier, Civil Rule 56 authorizes the court to
consider "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file," as well as
affidavits, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. This
language should not, however, be read so restrictively as to exclude
the use of materials obtained through other discovery procedures,
such as answers to written interrogatories. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 (c) was amended in 1963 to permit such written answers
among the materials considered when ascertaining the existence of a
'The fact that an affidavit is submitted by an attorney on behalf of his client does not
preclude its consideration if it otherwise meets the requirements of the rule. Meadows v.
Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967).
'Henry v. St. Regis Paper Co., 55 Wn. 2d 148, 346 P.2d 692 (1959).
"Civil Rule 56(e).
'Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967).
"Civil Rule 56(e).
'Civil Rule 56(g). See Jensen v. Arntzen, 67 Wn. 2d 202, 406 P.2d 954 (1965).
Vol. 45: 1, 1970
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genuine issue of material fact. But even before that, it was generally
assumed that they could be so used under the federal rule, and the
Washington rule should be read accordingly.46 Clearly, the most
effective use of summary judgment procedures can be achieved when
full use is made of the multiple discovery devices.
The phrase "admissions on file" of course includes admissions ob-
tained under discovery rules.4 7 In addition, stipulations between the
parties or counsel, admissions by counsel in court, and admissions in
pre-trial orders should be included as permissible subjects for the
court's consideration. There is also authority supporting the use of
documentary evidence and oral testimony under the federal summary
judgment rule.48 The Washington Supreme Court has further author-
ized consideration of matters which are the subject of judicial no-
tice,40 and also the use of presumptions,50 when ruling on motions
for summary judgment. Finally, briefs are naturally very useful in
demonstrating the existence or non-existence of a genuine issue of
fact."' In view of the broad interpretation the courts have given this
area of the rule, counsel should employ ingenuity in collecting factual
materials for a summary judgment proceeding, rather than feel liter-
ally restricted to the items named in the rule.
B. Parties and Time Limitations
Though defendants are more commonly successful in moving for
summary judgments, the rule governing the procedure permits motions
by either party.52 Whichever party makes the motion has the burden
"See 6 J. MooRE, FaDaA.L PRACTICE RuL.s PavnLT 940 (1966). See also L. OR-
LAND, 4 WASHIINGTON PRACTICE (2d ed. 1968).
4 Civil Rule 36. See 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.11[6] at 2199 (2d ed. 1966).
4q6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RuLES PLa LBT 945 (1966).
'American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wn. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962).
'Bates v. Bowles White & Co., 56 Wn. 2d 374, 353 P.2d 663 (1960).
'While not specifically provided for in Civil Rule 56, briefs are desirable and are
commonly used. See Eschbach, Summary Judgment In Indiana: Some Observations Based
Upon the Federal Experience, 2 InD. LEGAL F. 67, 71 (1968).
If the motion is based upon depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
the like, the critical language therein should be incorporated in a brief along with
reference to page and line of the source. This, of course, is for the convenience of the
judge and to encourage his consideration of the materials. In addition, care should be
taken to get the brief to the judge personally a few days before the scheduled hearing.
'Civil Rule 56(a) provides for the motion by "[a] party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory judgment" while subsec-
tion (b) allows for the motion by the party against whom each of the above is asserted
or sought.
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of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact,"3
irrespective of who has the burden of proof on the issue at trial.'
The practice is to carefully scrutinize the affidavits of the moving
party and indulge some leniency with respect to the affidavits of the
opposing party.50 The allegations of the opponent are ordinarily not
required to be as well-supported as those of the movant.56 This is
practically so, even though in theory summary judgment may be
granted in favor of the non-movant, if during the hearing it appears
that he is so entitled57
A plaintiff cannot move for summary judgment until after expiration
of the period within which the defendant is required to appear, or
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant.5
This enables the defendant to obtain counsel before being confronted
'Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn. 2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968); Hughes v. Chehalis School
Dist. No. 302, 61 Wn. 2d 222, 377 P.2d 642 (1963); Rossiter v. Moore, 59 Wn. 2d 722,
370 P.2d 250 (1962).
'See State ex rel. Bond v. State, 62 Wn. 2d 487, 490, 383 P.2d 288, 299 (1963), where it
was stated: "Thus, even though in a trial on the merits the state would have the burden
of proving its affirmative defense of laches, the reverse is true on relator's motion for
summary judgment. Where the issue of laches has been properly raised, relator must
establish that there is no laches or reasonable inference thereof to be drawn from the
undisputed facts." See Peninsula Truck Lines, Inc. v. Tooker, 63 Wn. 2d 724, 388 P.2d
958 (1964); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wn. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962);
Reynolds v. Kuhl, 58 Wn. 2d 313, 362 P.2d 589 (1961); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn. 2d
678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
'Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967). The
court added some language which could create difficulty if taken out of context. "In this
latter respect, it should be added, however, that the leniency spoken of does not permit
of overtrading upon the indulgence of the court, for it is still necessary for the non-
movant to satisfy the court that there. exists a genuine issue of material fact to be tried,
particularly in the face of a strong showing to the contrary." The court nevertheless
clearly put the burden upon the movant to establish the absence of a genuine issue.
See also State ex rel. Bond v. State, 62 Wn. 2d 487, 491, 383 P.2d 288, 291 (1963) in
which the court said, "Facts asserted by the nonmoving party and supported by affidavits
or any other proper evidentiary material must be taken as true."
'Address by Harry Ellsworth Foster, Conference on Trial Practices & Procedures,
May, 1955.
'The limitation is stated in Leland v. Frogge, 71 Wn. 2d 197, 201, 427 P.2d 724, 727
(1967) that, "While there is authority for granting summary judgment for a nonmoving
party (Rubenser v. Felice, 58 Wn. 2d 862, 365 P.2d 320 (1961); 4 Orland, Wash. Prac.
66 (1966)), it would be expected that such judgment would be either one of dismissal.
or for relief sought by or uncontestedly due that second party."
5' Civil Rule 56(a). FEn. R. Civ. P. 56(a) provides, "at any time after the expiration
of twenty days from the commencement of the action" rather than "at any time after
the expiration of the period within which the defendant is required to appear."
Civil Rule 12(a), which allows a party ten additional days to answer after the court's
disposition of certain motions, does not apply to a summary judgment proceeding. The
validity of a motion for summary judgment is determined by the period in which the
defendant must appear and not by the period in which he must answer. State ex rel.
Carrol v. Simmons, 61 Wn. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962).
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with the plaintiff's motion. A defendant, however, may move for sum-
mary judgment at any time. 9
Regardless of who brings the motion for summary judgment, it
must be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hear-
ing,60 in order to enable the opponent to adequately prepare. Ordi-
narily, this rule would preclude any original motion for summary
judgment at any time later than ten days before the trial date.61
But presumably a trial court might, in its discretion, grant a post-
ponement of a trial in order to allow service and hearing of a motion
for summary judgment.
C. The Opponent's Burden
When a party moves for summary judgment and supports his
motion in the manner described above, a difficult question arises as
to what the opponent must do to prevent the entry of summary
judgment against him. May the opponent rely upon the general alle-
gations in his pleading, or must he do more?
In the federal system, there was at one time a split of authority on
this problem, mainly between the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, which held that the party could rely on his
allegations in the complaint, and the other Circuits.62 To remedy this
uncertainty, the following language was added to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e) in 1963:63
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
In W. G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts,64 the problem was presented to the
Washington Court. The plaintiff alleged a general and continuing
-Civil Rule 56(b).
' Civil Rule 56(c). See also State ex rel. Zemple v. Twitchell, 59 Wn. 2d 419, 367 P.2d
985 (1962) and Mayflower Air-Conditions, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Supply, Inc. 54
Wn. 2d 211, 339 P.2d 89 (1959).
'See Comment, Summary Judgment, 34 WAsH. L. REV. 204, 205 (1959).
c2 6 J. MooP, FEDmAL PRtacrcE RuLs PAarpHLET 941 (1966).0 4FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).73 Wn. 2d 434, 438 P.2d 867 (1968).
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conspiracy by the defendants to damage his business. Defendants
moved for summary judgment and filed an affidavit by an attorney
who had overseen the controversy between the parties for ten years.
He stated that, to his personal knowledge, every act complained of
had occurred several years before. Plaintiff failed to come forth with
any facts establishing a continuing conspiracy, and defendants were
granted summary judgment. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
the result, although Washington's summary judgment rule does not
literally require an opponent to use affidavits or other materials to
prove the existence of a factual dispute. Still, in order to defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, it is practically
necessary to do more than merely rely on the allegations in a pleading.
The foundation for this result in Washington was laid in Almy v.
Kvamme,65 where plaintiff, opposing defendant's motion for summary
judgment, contended that the facts alleged in his complaint established
a conflict which could not be resolved at the summary judgment hear-
ing, and that he was not obliged to disclose the nature of his evidence
at that hearing. The Washington Supreme Court ruled to the con-
trary: 66
The office of a summary judgment proceeding is to avoid a useless trial.
It is to test, in advance of trial, whether evidence to sustain the allegations
in the complaint actually exists. Evidentiary pleadings alone, if properly
challenged by controverting affidavits, depositions, and admissions pre-
sented by the moving party, will not carry the issue of fact to a trial. The
object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate the wheat from the
chaff in evidentiary pleadings, and to establish, at the hearing, the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a genuine, material issue. Preston v. Duncan, 55
Wn. 2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960). Applying these rules to the record be-
fore us, we find no genuine issue of material fact which would prevent the
trial court from granting respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Thus, by decisional construction, Washington has reached a result
conforming to the amended federal rule.
Particular note must be taken of Preston v. Duncan,7 which is
cited in the Almy case. Plaintiff brought an action against a six-year
old child for having jumped upon plaintiff "intentionally and with
-63 Wn. 2d 326, 387 P.2d 372 (1963).
"Id. at 329, 387 P.2d at 374.
'55 Wn. 2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
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full knowledge of the probable effects," and against the parents of
the child, who had "full knowledge" of such acts by the child but
failed to warn plaintiff. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
submitting plaintiff's deposition and written statement concerning her
injury; plaintiff presented no affidavits, but simply relied upon the
allegations in her complaint. The Washington Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's entry of summary judgment, even though the plaintiff
could not prevail upon the basis of the facts then before the court,
because she might have additional evidence which could be presented
at a trial. The court posed the question in this manner: "If such
evidence exists, is the plaintiff required to produce it when the defen-
dant's showing on their motion for summary judgment does not
negate the existence of such additional evidence?" 6 The response
was in the negative. According to the court, while it would have been
better for all concerned if plaintiff had set forth her evidence, yet
because defendants had made no showing of a lack of evidence, plain-
tiff was entitled to rely upon the allegations in her complaint.
Although this decision may seem contrary to the decisions in Almy
and Platts, Preston is still good authority. As has been previously dis-
cussed, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact. If the mov-
ing party does not sustain that burden, summary judgment should not
be entered, irrespective of whether or not the opponent has submitted
affidavits or other responsive materials. That is the Preston case. 9 If
the moving party makes an adequate showing, the non-moving party
must respond. That is the situation in Almy and Platts.7°
Just as the summary judgment procedure provides a means to pierce
the pleadings, so likewise it may be used to pierce affidavits. In Reed
v. Streib,71 plaintiff complained of a conspiracy, and filed an affidavit
cs55 Wn. 2d at 681, 349 P.2d at 606.
'See also a more recent case, Leland v. Frogge, 71 Wn. 2d 197, 427 P.2d 724 (1967),
in which the court at 203 said, "We find ourselves in much the same position as in
Preston v. Duncan, supra. We cannot with any certainty tell what are the issues of fact,
but the material presented by appellant's motion was not sufficient to defeat the ques-
tions raised by respondent's pleadings and affidavit. Consequently, the order granting
summary judgment was not properly made."
,.Presumably the response of the nonmoving party might be in the form of the original
pleading, if verified, and if it met the requirements of affidavits as set forth in Civil Rule
56(e). See 6 J. MooRE, FEDERA. PRAcrc RuLES PA Mi H 944-45 (1966); 4 L. ORLAND,
WAsHYGToN PRActicE 67-68 (Supp. 1966); and Reed v. Streib, 65 Wn. 2d 700, 399
P.2d 338 (1965). Ordinarily the pleading would not meet such requirements.
65 Wn. 2d 700, 399 P.2d 338 (1965).
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containing evidentiary details linking all of the defendants except one,
Reed, as to whom there was simply the allegation of conspiracy. Reed
moved for summary judgment and filed an affidavit denying any con-
spiracy on his part. The court pierced the formal allegations in plain-
tiff's affidavit and pleadings, and entered summary judgment for Reed.
Motions for summary judgment by the other defendants failed, how-
ever, because as to them plaintiff had raised genuine issues of fact.72
IV. EFFECTS OF THE MOTION
When the defendant has moved for summary judgment, may the
plaintiff thereafter obtain a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right? In
the federal courts, the answer is clearly "no"-an express rule limits
the plaintiff's right of nonsuit to "any time before service by the ad-
verse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which-
ever first occurs."7 3
In Washington, the answer is not so clear. In Beritich v. Starlet
Corp.,74 the plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
after the defendant had moved for summary judgment, and after the
trial court had orally announced its decision in favor of the defen-
dant. Plaintiff's motion was nevertheless granted; on appeal, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court reversed the voluntary dismissal for three rea-
sons. First, and most importantly, the summary judgment procedure
would be useless to defendants if plaintiffs were permitted voluntary
nonsuit after an adverse oral decision in a summary judgment hearing.
Second, because the summary judgment rule is a more recent proce-
dural innovation than the rule authorizing voluntary dismissals, a dis-
position under the more recent rule should control the scope of the
older right of voluntary dismissal, insofar as there might be conflict.76
"A more recent application of the Reed principle is Meissner v. Simpson Timber Co.,
69 Wn. 2d 949, 421 P.2d 674 (1966).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
"' 69 Wn. 2d 454, 418 P.2d 762 (1966).
7 Voluntary nonsuits were governed by Pleading, Practice & Procedure Rule 41.08W at
the time of the case. Civil Rule 41(a), which now governs, is basically the same insofar
as pertinent to the present consideration. The court placed some emphasis upon the term
"affirmative relief", which was present in PPP 41.08W and is not in Civil Rule 41(a),
but this term does not seem critical in view of the policy reasons stated for the Beritich
result. In short, though the voluntary dismissal rule in its present wording is now more
recent than the summary judgment rule, it seems clear that Beritich is still the law on its
facts.
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Third, the situation was said to be analogous to one formerly governed
by a statute which allowed a voluntary nonsuit "at any time before
the court has announced its decision"; 7 that time had passed in this
case.
Clearly, Beritich denies any right to voluntary nonsuit after the trial
court has announced its decision to grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The Beritich court posed, but did not answer, the
entirely distinct question whether a non-moving plaintiff in a summary
judgment procedure should be entitled, as a matter of right, to a vol-
untary nonsuit after the motion for summary judgment has been made,
but before the court has made any pronouncement. The second basis
for the Beritich decision appears relevant to this question. The court
emphasized the relative newness of the summary judgment procedure,
apparently laying emphasis on the language of the then more recent
rule that the summary judgment sought "shall be rendered forth-
with. ' 7  This, combined with the unnecessary posing of the question,
seems to suggest that the plaintiff's right to nonsuit will be terminated
by the defendant's motion alone. But this has not been decided, and
the answer to the question will turn on whether the court prefers the
policy of allowing plaintiffs to obtain dismissals as a matter of right
up to the time that they rest at the conclusion of their opening case
or that of allowing defendants to obtain an early determination of
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
The filing of a motion for summary judgment by a plaintiff can
affect the defendant's right to dismissal for want of prosecution. In
Storey v. Shane278 plaintiff moved for summary judgment four months
after defendant answered; ten days later, plaintiff's motion was denied.
After the suit had remained dormant for nine more months, plaintiff
served and filed notice for trial, at which time defendant moved to dis-
"REm. RaV. STAT. § 1389. In re Archer's Estate, 36 Wn. 2d 505, 219 P.2d 112 (1950),
held that this statute was superseded by the court rule relating to voluntary dismissals.
Thus it would appear that the quoted portion of this statute, which was later included
in WAS . REV. CODE 4.56.120(1) (1956) and cited in Beritich, is pertinent, not as authority
controlling voluntary dismissals, but only insofar as it enunciates a policy deemed
relevant to determining the relationship of voluntary dismissals to summary judgments.
'The voluntary dismissal rule, formerly Pleading, Practice & Procedure Rule 41.08W,
was amended in 1967 to its present form, Civil Rule 41(a). Thus it is now more recent
than the summary judgment rule, Civil Rule 56. However, the amendment does not
seem directed at the present problem nor particularly relevant thereto.
62 Wn. 2d 640, 384 P.2d 379 (1963).
Washington Law Review Vol. 45: 1, 1970
miss for want of prosecution by the plaintiff within one year from
joinder of issue. 9 The Washington court had previously held that nor-
mal pre-trial activities, such as the taking of depositions, serving of
interrogatories, and making demands for admissions and applications
to inspect adversely-held evidence, did not toll the period within which
cases were to be noted for trial." The Storey court held, however, that
the one-year period for noting was tolled by a good faith filing of a
motion for summary judgment and disposition of that motion. Plain-
tiff's subsequent noting of the case for trial was therefore timely.
There was language in the Storey case which suggested that tolling
of the prosecution period would not occur unless both the motion for
summary judgment and the court's decision thereon were made within
one year from joinder of issue, although the court did talk at length
about the importance of good faith prosecution of the motion."' But
in a subsequent case, the court, relying on Storey, made it clear that
the motion for summary judgment alone, if timely filed (and, presum-
ably, if made in good faith), tolls the operation of the rule requiring
noting within one year, until the issues raised by the motion are re-
solved by court order.8 -
In the event a summary judgment is entered, findings of fact and
conclusions of law are unnecessary."3 Consequently, if they are entered,
they are deemed superfluous, and of no prejudice to the party against
whom the judgment is entered.84 Furthermore, failure to assign error
to them has no effect upon an appeal from the summary judgment.8"
'This was based on Pleading, Practice & Procedure Rule 41.04W, since superseded by
Civil Rule 41(b) (1).
' Gray v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 60 Wn. 2d 236, 373 P.2d 481 (1962).
"
1Storey v. Shane, 62 Wn. 2d 640, 643, 384 P.2d 379, 381 (1963): "But it is not the
mere filing of the motion that tolls the rule. It is the court's decision thereon, either in
denial or granting in whole or in part, that sets the one year's time running again. One
cannot simply file the motion, let it lie dormant, and then assume that the cause has
been renewed for an additional year. It must be filed in good faith, supported with a
record that indicates not only good faith but an intent to prevail, and brought before
the court for hearing with reasonable dispatch under the rules prevailing in the forum
where maintained. It is the court's ruling pursuant to such well-brought motion that
tolls the rule."
'Nicacio v. Yakima Chief Ranches, Inc., 63 Wn. 2d 945, 389 P.2d 888 (1964).
' Civil Rule 52(a)(5)(B); Felton v. Menan Starach Co., 66 Wn. 2d 792, 405 P.2d
585 (1965).
'State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wn. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962); State ex rel.
Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wn. 2d 419, 367 P.2d 985 (1962).
Washington Optometric Association Inc. v. County of Pierce, 73 Wn. 2d 445, 438
P.2d 861 (1968).
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V. APPEALS FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING
A common difficulty confronting counsel after entry of an order in
a summary judgment proceeding lies in determining whether the par-
ticular order is appealable. With respect to judgments on the whole
case, the problem is one of easy solution. If a summary judgment is
granted, and it disposes of all the issues, then it is appealable just like
any other final judgment on the merits.86 On the other hand, if the
court's order denies the motion for summary judgment on all issues,
the order is not appealable. Such an order is interlocutory in nature,
and the case remains for trial.87
The problem is more difficult when the court's ruling on the motion
for summary judgment disposes of some of the issues before it, but not
all of them. Certainly the court has the authority to make such an
order. For example, Civil Rule 56(c) provides that "[a] summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages." ' Civil Rule 56(d) provides that the court may issue an
order "specifying the facts that appear without substantial contro-
versy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just."89 When multiple claims are advanced, the court
may dispose of one or more by summary order and leave the rest for
trialY0 In each instance, counsel may desire an immediate appeal.
Maybury v. Seattle9" is instructive as to when appeals may be taken.
In that case, the court ruled that there was no genuine issue with re-
spect to the city's liability, and that trial should be limited to the issue
of damages. The Washington Supreme Court held this order not ap-
pealable, because to authorize such piecemeal review would interfere
with the orderly administration of justice, unduly burden the supreme
court, and create unnecessary delays for the parties. For the same rea-
sons, the court refused to grant a writ of certiorari to review the inter-
locutory order.9"




Crosthwaite v. Crosthwaite, 56 Wn. 2d 838, 358 P.2d 978 (1960).
53 Wn. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 878 (1959).
12Apparently the court considered the order an interlocutory judgment within Civil
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Dictum in Maybury 3 indicated the same result with respect to or-
ders entered under Civil Rule 56(d), limiting the issues to be tried.
In a subsequent decision, the court held such partial orders to be
merely interlocutory summary adjudications and not appealable. 4
With respect to multiple-claim actions, however, the same result is
not necessary. In Crosthwaite v. Crosthwaite,95 the trial court, after a
summary judgment hearing, entered an order which (1) awarded plain-
tiff a sum for alimony and support, (2) ordered reinstatement of a
life insurance policy in plaintiff's behalf, and (3) left for determination
at trial the question whether the defendant should be required to make
any future monthly payments. Upon appeal by defendant, the court
stated the question to be, "Are the money judgment and the order for
specific performance a 'final judgment' (and thus appealable) upon a
part of plaintiff's claim, pursuant to Rule 56(a), or are they simply
an interlocutory summary adjudication of established facts (as distin-
guished from a judgment), pursuant to Rule 56(d) ... ?" The court
concluded that the order was an interlocutory summary adjudication
of a portion of plaintiff's claims, under Civil Rule 56(d), and that it
was not appealable. However, the court went on to state that if Plead-
ing, Practice and Procedure Rule 42 (b) (now Civil Rule 54(b)) had
been in effect at the time, the trial court could have directed a final
appealable judgment upon one or more, but less than all, of the plain-
tiff's claims.9 7 Thus, it is clear that a court ruling upon a multiple-
Rule 56(c). In a later case, Hontz v. White, 56 Wn. 2d 538, 348 P.2d 420 (1960), the
court held an interlocutory order under Civil Rule 56(c) to be not appealable. See also
4 L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTIcE 263-67 (2d ed. 1968).
0'53 Wn. 2d at 718-19, 336 P.2d at 880-81.
* Grill v. Meydenbauer Bay Yacht Club, 57 Wn. 2d 800, 359 P.2d 1040 (1961).
°56 Wn. 2d 838, 358 P.2d 978 (1960).
'Civil Rule 56(a) provides in part, "A party seeking to recover upon a claim .. .
may .. .move ... for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof."
Civil Rule 56(d) provides: "If on motion under the rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing
of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial con-
troversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial con-
troversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action, the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
he conducted accordingly."
o' Civil Rule 54(b) provides:
JUDGMENT UPON MULTIPLE CLAIMS OR INVOLVING MUI.TIPLE PARTIES.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
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claim action in a summary judgment proceeding may issue an appeal-
able order, even though it does not dispose of all claims." But it should
be noted that the trial court does not make an appealable order unless
it expressly directs the entry of a final judgment.9
The Crosthwaite decision does not reach the question of whether a
trial court sitting in a summary judgment hearing on a single-claim
action may enter an order which is appealable even though it does not
dispose of all issues. Civil Rule 56(a) states that "[a] party seeking
to recover upon a claim . . . may . . . move . . . for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof." If he moves for
summary judgment on a part, and the relief is granted, is there an
appealable order?
In Crosthwaite, the court, by formulating the question in the man-
ner quoted above, seems to suggest a distinction between sections of
Civil Rule 56, to the effect that a partial order entered under Civil
Rule 56(a) would be appealable, whereas an order issued under Civil
Rule 56(d) is not appealable. Even so, the holding in Crosthwaite is
not directly in point, and the question remains unresolved in Wash-
ington.00
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination in the judgment, that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any
of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
'3An opinion was written in the case, reported in 355 P.2d 801, but not reported in
the Washington Reports, which applied Civil Rule 54(b) (then Pleading, Practice &
Procedure Rule 42 (b)), to the Crosthwaite facts. The opinion was withdrawn when it
was discovered that PPP 42(b) was not in effect at the time of the action in the trial
court and thus did not govern. The new opinion was then written as reported in 56
Wn. 2d 838, 358 P.2d 978 (1961).
The court apparently has had no difficulty in allowing for appeals from summary judg-
ments as to less than all of the parties in multiple party actions. See Ferrin v. Donnele-
feld, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 444 P.2d 701 (1968). Presumably, Civil Rule 54(b) must be com-
plied with in such instances. See Eschbach, Summary Judgment in Indiana: Some
Observations Based Upon the Federal Experience, 2 IN. LmAL F. 67, 77-80 (1968).
G'Civil Rule 54(b).
" In the first, unofficial, opinion in Crosthwaite, reported in 355 P.2d 801 but not
in the Washington Reports, the court said, at 805 "We reserve, for later decision, the
question of whether Rule 56(d) necessarily precludes a summary judgment (as distin-
guished from a pretrial interlocutory summary adjudication) upon 'any part' of plaintiff's
claim, as set forth in Rule 56(a) ... for our principle concern is whether the order be-
fore us is appealable."
In the second, official, opinion in Crosthwaite, 56 Wn. 2d 838, 358 P.2d 978 (1961),
while not expressly reserving the question, the court seemingly did not answer it. The
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When a non-appealable summary adjudication order is entered, it is,
of course, later reviewable on appeal from the final judgment, assum-
ing a proper foundation for such review has been laid below. 1' But
the Supreme Court will review only those matters presented for the
superior court's consideration before entry of the interlocutory sum-
mary adjudication. 102
Likewise, supreme court review of a final summary judgment covers
only matters of judicial notice and such other matters as were pre-
sented to the trial court for its consideration before entry of the sum-
mary judgment. 0 3 The Supreme Court will not consider depositions
taken after the entry of summary judgment, or other evidentiary ma-
terials which the trial court did not possess at the time it entered sum-
mary judgment. 0 4 Nor will the Supreme Court consider any arguments
not raised in the pleadings, depositions and affidavits submitted to the
lower court with the motion for summary judgment. 0 5 The record for
review may be incorporated in a statment of facts certified by the trial
court, or identified with particularity in the summary judgment and
furnished to the Supreme Court by certified transcript. 06
A summary judgment is deemed to be a final decision on the merits
of the case,' and therefore has res judicata effects, including merger,
court did quote extensively from 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2311 (2d ed. 1958),
which quotation suggests that Rule 56(a) does not have the effect of making a partial
summary judgment appealable. It is not clear, however, whether the Washington court
agreed or disagreed. Instead the court simply concluded that the particular order was "an
interlocutory summary adjudication upon a portion of plaintiff's claims, entered pursuant
to Rule of Pleading, Practice & Procedure 56(d), RCW Vol. 0."
For discussion of the problem see Comment, Partial Summary Judgments Under Rule
56(a), 32 U. Cm L. Rav. 816 (1965), and Eschbach, Summary Judgment in Indiana:
Some Observations Based Upon the Federal Experience, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 67, 73-77 (1968).
''WAsHr. R. 0. A. 14(1) and 17. See Lewis County Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Black, 60
Wn. 2d 362, 374 P.2d 157 (1962) and Clausing v. Kassner, 60 Wn. 2d 12, 371 P.2d 633
(1962). For a discussion of the reviewability of an award of attorney's fees under Civil
Rule 56(g) upon appeal from the final judgment, see Jensen v. Arntzen, 67 Wn. 2d 202,
406 P.2d 954 (1965).
' Clausing v. Kassner, 60 Wn. 2d 12, 371 P.2d 633 (1962). Of course, a party might
properly move during the trial for a reconsideration and setting aside or amendment of
the summary adjudication order and the ruling on such motion would likewise be re-
viewable on appeal from the final judgment, based upon the record presented in con-
junction with such motion.
'°American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wn. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962).
Id. See Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn. 2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968).
1 Ferrin v. Donnellefeld, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 444 P.2d 701 (1968).
' Kataisto v. Low, 73 Wn. 2d 341, 438 P.2d 623 (1968); Meadows v. Grant's Auto
Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967); Floyd v. Dept. of Labor & Ind.,
68 Wn. 2d 938, 416 P.2d 355 (1966); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wn. 2d
811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962).
'o D. PASTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON IN THE ARSENAL OF
LEGAL ADMINISTRATION 7 (1963).
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bar, and collateral estoppel. But a denial of a motion for summary
judgment is not considered to reach the merits, although it may con-
stitute a direct estoppel as to the point in issue,'08 and may establish
the law of the case upon that point. 0 9
VI. RELATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO OTHER
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS
When matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, depositions
and admissions, are presented to, and accepted by, a trial court in con-
junction with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or with
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion is treated as a
request for summary judgment, governed by Civil Rule 56.110 The
court may elect to consider only the pleadings,"' but ordinarily, a
court will probably admit and consider such extra materials when
they are offered. A refusal to do so, and a subsequent denial of one of
the preliminary motions, may waste the court's time, because a second
motion for summary judgment, with the accompanying materials, will
very likely follow.
Such treatment of a preliminary motion and accompanying materials
as a motion for summary judgment is well illustrated in Washington
Optometric Ass'n Inc. v. County of Pierce."2 In that case, defendant
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, among other reasons. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss, because the complaint failed to state a cause of action, but
on appeal, the Washington Supreme Court treated the dismissal as an
order for summary judgment, because the trial judge had relied upon
supporting affidavits in making his decision. Similarly, in another case
where a party moved for judgment on the pleadings, and supported
his motion with affidavits and exhibits, he was deemed to have moved
for summary judgment, and on the record summary judgment was
granted." 3
"~'L. ORLAND, 2 WASBNGTON PRACTiCE 411 (2d ed. 1965).
'19 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULEs PAiuIPHIET 949 (1966). Presumably the law-
of-the-case doctrine will be applied flexibly. Cf. Greene v. Rothschild, 68 Wn. 2d 5, 414
P.2d 1013 (1966).
'Civil Rule 12(b) and (c).
'State ex rel Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wn. 2d 419, 367 P.2d 985 (1962).
73 Wn. 2d 445, 438 P.2d 861 (1968); Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wn. 2d 777, 399 P.2d
591 (1965).
"'State ex rel. Town of Mercer Island v. City of Mercer Island, 58 Wn. 2d 141,
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As noted above, Civil Rule 56(c) requires that a motion for sum-
mary judgment be served at least ten days before the time fixed for
hearing. It is unclear whether this ten-day notice requirement applies
with equal force when other preliminary motions are accompanied by
extra-pleading materials, and are thus treated as motions for summary
judgment under Civil Rules 12(b) and (c). Those sections provide
that, when motions thereunder are treated as motions for summary
judgment, "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56" (emphasis
added). Some early cases suggested that the ten-day requirement ap-
plied to such "transformed" motions,11 4 but a more recent decision
seems to indicate that the "reasonable opportunity" requirement is to
be construed independently of the ten-day requirement. 5 Neverthe-
less, until this is made more clear by some more direct holding, only
the ten-day notice can be safely relied upon by Washington practi-
tioners." 6
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for judgment on the
pleadings, and for summary judgment, all raise only a legal question.
The great advantage of the motion for summary judgment is that it
authorizes reliance on materials beyond the pleadings in order to re-
solve the legal question. In many cases, examination of the pleadings
alone may give the misleading impression that the litigation cannot be
resolved simply as a matter of law; yet the consideration of additional
materials will often reveal the existence of only a legal issue, alleviat-
ing the need for a trial."7 To avoid the delay involved in bringing two
motions, Civil Rules 12 (b) and (c) should be liberally interpreted to
encourage litigants to produce extra-pleading materials at the time pre-
liminary motions are made, and to increase the use of this device for
converting preliminary motions into proceedings for summary judg-
ment.
142 n.1, 361 P.2d 369, 370 (1961). See also Reed v. Streib, 65 Wn. 2d 700, 399 P.2d
338 (1965).
"' Mayflower Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Supply, Inc., 54 Wn. 2d 211,
339 P.2d 89 (1959). Cf. Lightner v. Balow, 59 Wn. 2d 856, 370 P.2d 982 (1962). See
3 L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE 117-18 (Supp. 1966).
mStevens v. Murphy, 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966) (dictum).
'
6 This suggestion by Dean Orland in 3 L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTI E 118 (Supp.
1966), still seems to be pertinent, despite Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d
668 (1966).
"See Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn. 2d 351, 359, 363 P.2d 138, 143
(1961).
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VII. RELATIONSHIP OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PRE-
TRIAL CONFERENCES
Civil Rule 56 (d) provides that if a case cannot be completely deter-
mined on a motion for summary judgment, and a trial is necessary, the
court shall nevertheless, if practicable, ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy, and what facts are actually con-
troverted in good faith. The court is further directed to issue pre-trial
orders specifying such facts as may appear beyond substantial con-
troversy. At any subsequent trial of the case, these facts are deemed
established. While the purpose of this provision is merely to salvage
whatever partial benefit is possible from an unsuccessful summary
judgment proceeding, it nonetheless establishes a practice which can
be of peculiar practical utility to attorneys in the pre-trial stage of
litigation.
An order rendered under such circumstances is comparable to one
which may issue under Civil Rule 16 following a pre-trial confer-
ence. 1 8 Of course, in some cases, a motion for summary judgment is
inappropriate, and the pre-trial conference system should be used.
Such conferences may serve roughly the same function as a summary
judgment proceeding, in that they both may expedite trial by dispos-
ing of matters about which there is no genuine issue." 9
Civil Rule 16 authorizes courts, in their discretion, to call such con-
ferences to consider simplification of issues, the necessity or desirability
of amending the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of
fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, and limi-
tation of the number of expert witnesses. The conference may also
consider "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.1' 2 0 Counsel or court may broach practically any subject in-
cluding jurisdiction, venue, separation of issues and separate trials,
consolidation of trials, striking or adding of parties, stipulations, set-
tlements, and rulings as to depositions, interrogatories, witnesses and
evidence.'2' The only apparent limit is the discretion of the court.
13 W. BARRON & A. HoTzoR, FEDnAL PRACTICE & PROCEDuRE 190 (1958), quoted in
Crosthwaite v. Crosthwaite, 56 Wn. 2d 838, 358 P.2d 978 (1960).
'See In re Glant's Estate, 57 Wn. 2d 309, 356 P.2d 707 (1960), as to the purpose
of such a conference and the effect of an order rendered therein.
a' Civil Rule 16(a)(5).
a- Peterson v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 40 Wn. 2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161 (1952); Kralevich
v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 23 Wn. 2d 640, 161 P.2d 661 (1945).
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Despite their many advantages, formal pre-trial conferences are not
a common practice,12 2 for several reasons. Much of the litigation in
state courts is of too "small" a character, considering the size of the
problems and amounts involved, to justify the time and expense of
formal pre-trial conferences. In addition, the focusing of public atten-
tion in recent years on federal pre-trial practices has led many attor-
neys to informally pre-try their own cases to a greater degree as a
matter of course, thus diminishing the utility of formal procedures.
Furthermore, in the more populous counties, the use of master-calen-
dar assignment systems has made pre-trial conferences less desirable,
because the same judge will not necessarily preside at both the confer-
ence and the trial. Formal pre-trial procedures seem best suited to the
smaller counties which have an individual assignment calendar; but
in those counties, less formal procedures are favored. Finally, a sub-
stantial segment of the bar seems opposed to pre-trial conferences as
a normal procedure, because they require preparation of each case
twice, and participation in two formal proceedings. Without the full
support of the bar, the objectives of such conferences are often im-
peded, and the result is often delay.
Because such formal conferences are uncommon, it becomes most
important to encourage wider use of Civil Rule 56 (d). Summary judg-
ment proceedings are now relatively common, and through them at
least some of the values of pre-trial conferences can be achieved. More-
over, summary judgment proceedings may be very useful even when
a final judgment cannot appropriately be entered (due to the existence
of material factual issues), as the court may dispose of those issues
as to which there is no substantial controversy. The possibility of
narrowing the issues for trial and thereby speeding the process of
justice may thus justify the motion for summary judgment even though
total success is doubtful.
' This was the consensus of the superior court judges at the Washington Judicial
Conference in September, 1963. See Trautman, Causes & Cures of Delay (Report to the
Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice of the American Bar As-
sociation, Sept. 1963).
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